Home > Kalākośa > Kalāsamālocana Series > List of Books > Across the Himalayan Gap > 


[ Previous Page | Contents of the Book | Next Page ]

Better Understanding



Swaran Singh

Part 2


During these last twenty years of rapprochement Sino-lndian trade has risen from mere $ 2.5 million in 1977 to $ 1.16 billion for 1999. This expansion in trade has been possible because of persistent efforts on the part of Indian and Chinese trading and business communities, especially during these last ten years. In 1994 the two had signed protocols replacing their differential tariffs by granting each other the most favoured nation (MFN) trading status and since then their annual protocols continue to enumerate expanding list of items for their bilateral trade. The two sides have also occasionally been signing other trade related agreements. For example, on July 18, 1994, during his third visit to New Delhi, Foreign Minister Qian Qichen signed another trade agreement on “avoidance of double taxation”, which is expected to create further favourable conditions “to encourage business, scientific, cultural as well as personal exchanges in the future."[1] Though the Reserve Bank of India and the People’s Bank of China signed an MoU for resumption of direct banking links allowing their banks to set up representative offices in each others country in October 1994, there has been no, reciprocal action except that the State Bank of India has opened one branch in Beijing.[2] As much of the trade is in private hands, lack of infrastructural facilities like telecommunications, shipping and banking channels as also the differences of language and business culture have stood as important barrier.[3] Nevertheless, complementarities are gradually coming to the fore, pushing them closer together. China, for example, has enormous need and is ambitious to emerge as world’s largest producer of steel by year 2000 and will thus increasingly require India to supply high grade iron ore, The first Sino-lndian joint venture in this regard was already launched in Orissa (India) between India’s Mideast Integrated Steels Limited and China’s Metallurgical Import Export Corporation (CMIEC) in January 1993.[4] And here, their two agreements of November 1996 on (i) maritime shipping that (a) provides MFN to each others’ sea-borne trade commodities and ships and, (b) puts in place the double tax avoidance mechanism; and (ii) agreement on combating smuggling of narcotics and arms and other economic offenses on the Sio-lndian border will both go a long way in expanding the Sine-Indian trade ties.

As regards exploring collaborations for future, India’s growing expertise in computer software can strengthen China’s hands in dealing with its Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) problems with the United States. Other uncharted areas for future cooperation can include joint development and manufacture of aircraft and systems (for civilian needs to start with), ship-building and repairs, railway equipment etc.[5] China, for example, has already shown interest in participating in India’s Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) proiect.[6] Similarly, there were also reports about China, India and South Korea jointly working for developing a 100-seater civilian aircraft.[7] In fact, apart from these joint ventures, reviving other network like direct flights between various Chinese and Indian cities and re-building the old Burma Road (and ancient Silk Route) should now be reopened to serve the larger and necessary purposes of trade and transit.[8] This will completely transform the entire communication and trade profile of Sine-Indian ties. But in the long-run, it is their greater understanding as also their cooperation in more basic fields like agriculture and population control that will go a long way in helping them to fulfil their common desire for peace and development.[9]

As the preceding discussion shows so clearly a genuine process of Sino-ndian CSBMs has not only picked up momentum of their own but even reached a certain level of maturity where the two sides are even willing to exchange sensitive information on their military manpower and equipment, and to partake training with each other’s officers and men as also to show them each other’s defence facilities and establishments. Yet, at the same time, there are issues that have neither been ignored nor completely resolved and they continue to be cause of concern and even occasional friction between the two countries. But then considering the magnitude and complexities of Sino-Indian relations it will also be perhaps patently absurd to expect a perfect harmony between these two civilizational states and pragmatism demands that the best they can do is to be aware of both their strengths and difficulties and both should keep their eyes open to these advantages as well as pitfalls as they start evolving their working relationship in the future which will unfold its own challenges and opportunities.[10]

To first deal with the pitfalls, the boundary question remains the most central and toughest of all issues and slow progress here will continue to delay (if not block) the overall progress in Sino-Indian rapprochement.[11] The ramifications of this problem have to be understood in the context of their historical and geographical realities. Firstly, until the modern times, both China and India had never been in full knowledge or control of these far flung territories. Secondly, the areas involved cove, over 90,000 square kilometres of land and this generally consists of thousands of miles of deserts, snow capped mountains and dense tropical forests which means that much of it has never been inhabited, making it difficult to examine counter-claims by both sides in the absence of definite details, even local histories or folklore. This also makes it extremely difficult to obtain workable details of these world’s youngest and still growing mountain range where both its size and terrain pose serious technical difficulties, let alone evolving a political understanding which is further complicated by their domestic sensitivities. Though lot has been done during the eighteen rounds of Sine-Indian official border talks, with number of border related CSBMs put in place, the border issue remains mired in various bilateral and domestic compulsions and contradictions on both sides.

India, for example, has long been suggesting that steps be taken towards accurate assessment of existing force levels and a freeze should be effected on present troop strength with an expectation of subsequent reductions.[12] Analysts, in fact, believe that during early 1990s, India has unilaterally withdrawn about 35,000 troops from its eastern sector.[13] On the other hand, the PLA maintains a force between 180,000 and 300,000 soldiers and has directly ruled Tibet from 1950 to 1976, and indirectly thereafter.[14] Besides, unlike in the 1950s, Tibet today is connected to other military regions through four-lane highways and strategic roads and Beijing’s capability to airlift troops from its other neighbouring military regions has advanced very far from its comparative inability to use air force in 1962. The Gordian knot, therefore, can be cut only at the political level, and for that the Indian side should be clear in its own mind as to what that bottom line is that will be acceptable to the Parliament and the people.[15] China has continued to argue that their troops levels in Tibet are not relevant to the subject of Sino-Indian CSBMs though they have assured India about their commitment to downsizing their military presence in Tibet. Surely then, in the western sector India has not been able to realistically envisage any troop reduction. But here again, the November 1996 agreement on CSBMs, for the first time, underlines these Indian concerns and under its Article Ill all future troop ceilings are to be decided “in conformity with the principle of mutual and equal security” keeping in mind “parameters such as the nature of terrain, road communications and other infrastructure and time taken to induct/deinduct troops and annaments[16] And having already initiated disengagement in the eastern sector, this agreement should also open opportunities for troop withdrawals in the sensitive western sector.

As regards China, apart from their reservations on troop withdrawals from inside Tibet, its Indian connection continues to haunt their imaginations. This is despite the fact that successive governments in New Delhi have made repeated policy statements and given assurances saying that India regards Tibet as an integral part of China and that India will never allow its territory to be used for anti-China activities by its 100,000 Tibetans. However, during the 1990s, due to the increasing focus on human rights in the policies of most Western powers, His Highness the Dalai Lama has received expanding support and publicity for his cause through his increasingly frequent foreign trips and speeches, making China weary of Tibet’s expanding international recognition. Besides, even within India, apart from the Tibetans themselves, there does exit a small force of pro-Tibet activists ranging from those seeking Tibet’s independence to those who exhort Indian leaders to play the Tibet card in their dealings with Beijing.[17] And here, being a democratic country, governments in New Delhi have not been able to play too harsh against these variety of opinions and activities.

Then, apart from their bilateral ties, China’s arms transfers to Pakistan, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal have occasionally raised all kinds of doubts in India apprehending encirclement. China’s alleged supplies of nuclear designs, components, materials and other knowhow and facilities to Pakistan has been the most sensitive sour-point of Sino-Indian ties.[18] A few years ago, apart from persistent reports on China’s supplies of M-l 1 nuclear capable missiles, media reports tracing to American intelligence agencies and high-ranking officials confirming China’s supply to Pakistan of 5,000 ring magnets, and a furnace plant

for uranium enrichment to weapons grade. China has reportedly been involved in building a missile factory near Islamabad. Besides, China has been the largest and also the most reliable supplier of conventional weapons to Pakistan; has defence collaborations in almost all major areas, and apart from its alleged clandestine cooperation in building nuclear arsenals, China  remains the most ardent supplier and builder of Pakistan’s civilian nuclear programme.[19] But given the fact that Sino-Indian rapprochement has resulted in (a) India’s becoming the largest trading partner in South Asia and, (b)a marked shift in China’s policy on Kashmir, thus giving hope that all these and other irritants of Sino-lndian ties will also be resolved in due course of time.

Then talking about the strengths of the Sino-lndian ties it is this process of evolving CSBMs that forms the solid base. Moreover, the Panchsheel principles -- of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence -- which were propounded by these two countries in mid-1950s have not only stood the test of time but emerged as major positive element in strengthening their ties. Far from becoming outdated in the post-Cold War context, the essential correctness of these principles has become increasingly visible. In fact, in December 1988, it was formally proposed by Deng Xiaoping to Rajiv Gandhi, that the two countries

have a great potential for cooperation in working together “to recommend to the international community to take the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence as the norm for international relations."[20] Accordingly, the two countries have already evolved fairly substantial common approach towards various issues like restructuring of the United Nations and other international bodies. Though China remains uncommitted in supporting India’s candidature for a permanent seat at the UN Security Council, a favourable sign has been noticed in this regard during the early 1990s. During their October 1995 meeting at the UN 50th anniversary celebrations at New York, for example, Jiang Zemin expressed his understanding of India’s aspirations to become a permanent member of the expanded Security Council and said that in this regard “views of the general membership must be listened to in order to achieve a reasonable solution.“[21] This ensures that China is certainly not the one that will oppose to India’s candidature for the UN Security Council’s permanent seat.

India has also been supporting China’s entry to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and China supports India’s membership in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. Besides, with their increasing interest in the Asia-Pacific region, the ASEAN Regional [Security] Forum (ARF) is another platform which has witnessed both China and India working together to deter western members from becoming the masters of the Asian destiny. In fact, ARF’s Inter-sessional Support Group on CBMs has already laid out a long list of CSBMs for its members which will further consolidate the Sino-Indian mppmchement.[22] This is also expected to resolve some of Indian apprehensions about China’s military modernisation especially in areas like China’s defence expenditures which, as yet remain complete mystery for Indian scholars.[23] Then there are other issues like trade and human rights which have lately become the latest instrument in north-south confrontation. But here, the two may not have had identical views on human rights yet lately both have agreed that for the developing countries the most fundamental human rights is the right to subststence and right for development. The two are particularly opposed to the increasing practice on the part of the developed nations linking economic aid with human rights as an instrument for bringing pressure to bear on certain developing Countries. In fact, Sino-Indian cooperation in international forums has often frustrated vested interests amongst the western powers who seek to use similar linkage between nuclear proliferation, human rights and trade to pressurise developing countries like China and India.

That since 1986 Sino-Indian border has not suffered any major disruptions as compared to the incessant firing incidents and infiltration on the Indo-Pak borders, makes the Sino-Indian border almost an ideal example of good neighbourly relations. Sometimes commentators negate the process of CSBMs citing that this has not yet resulted in resolving the Sino-India boundary question. But keeping in mind the magnitude of complexities involved this gradual evaluation of CSBMs has not only preserved peace between these two Asian giants but also generated great deal of mutual trust and understanding giving hope to the prospects of final resolution of the border problem. This optimism rests not on euphoria, but on the solid base of growing shared interests and understanding between the two countries. There is a tendency to contrast the slow pace of Sino-Indian CSBMs with China’s fast recoveries of CSBMs with her newly acquired friends like Vietnam and Russia. Here, once again, one must appreciate that compared to, Sino-Indian interactions, China’s links with these two countries have been far more deep-rooted and extensive, and this is further reinforced by their ideological, institutional and cultural similarities. By comparison, friendly relations with India during the 1950 were essentially superficial, and its experience of 1962 devastating. It is in this context that CSBMs have played the critical role preparing both sides to find ways and means of working together. Global changes have also played their roles in further facilitating this process. And as a result, in the 1990s as both China and India envision their future role in this new expanded strategic spectrum of the 21st century Asia, their CSBMs become an absolute imperative towards achieving their common goals of peace and development. And looking at their track record of last 20-25 years, this gradual evolution of Sino-India CSBMs not only proves ‘that they both quite appreciate this new piecemeal approach to their complicated ground realities but this also gives hope of both these countries gradually coming closer and emerging as friends (may be partners) for the forthcoming Asian century of the next millennium.


Recent decision by New Delhi to weaponise its nuclear option has once again kicked-off debates about the future of Sino-Indian CSBMs. According to most commentators the decision to conduct five nuclear tests in May 1998, and more so India’s attemtps at highlighting “China” as being the most important factor behind New Delhi’s a difficult choice, have definitely administered a severe blow to the spirit of Sine-India rapprochement that has been so assiduously built up during the last two decades or so. I for one who have followed this debate quite seriously, feel that this debate has been purely academic with little substantial bearing on the ground reality.

I feel that apart from some momentary exchange of harsh words on the pan of government spokesmen of both countries, and some not-too-pleasant articles appearing in the media, nothing has altered the two governments’ commitment to CSBMs. The China-India Joint Working Group on the Boundary Question met as was scheduled for June, and the Military Commanders meeting at the border though delayed for a few days, did take place early June 1998. Similarly, bilateral trade and commerce have been going on normally, and other business and cultural interactions have continued without manifest interruptions. Of course, there is no denying the fact that the deep-seated misunderstanding between the two countries has now brought into sharper focus affecting the atmosphere of mutual goodwill, and it will take a while to recover the pre-Pokhran cordiality There was an element of abruptness in New Delhi’s reversal of her own longest-ever self-imposed moratorium’on nuclear testing that enough time was not given to the Indian diplomats to put Indian governments position across the board without causing misgivings from Beijing.

In fact, the Chinese side did display its calm by keeping quiet for nearly 24 hours following India’s announcement of the first two explosions May 11. But in the wake of India’s second series of three more explosion on May 13, followed by the leakage of Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee's letter to President Bill Clinton which described China’s nuclear arsenals as also their proliferation to India’s western neighbour as the main reason for India going nuclear, Beijing unleashed its trade and described India as trying to emerged as a “hegemone” in South Asia. This display of displeasure in issuing harsh official statements was then followed by China’s taking an active part in the passage of resolution 1172 by the UN Security Council and later in chairing another meeting of the P-5 Foreign Ministers in London on June 4. Then, there was the bilateral Joint Statements on South Asia by President Jiang Zemin and President Bill Clinton on June 27, and later when President Jiang Zemin visited Kazakhstan to attend the third presidential summit of five nations (China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Krygystan and Tajikistan) a similar Joint Statement expressing concern on South Asia implicitly putting the blame on India.

It is understandable that Beijing could not have been undisturbed giving the circumstances of India’s nuclear decision and the manner of her announcement of it. China’s reactions may have also been provoked by India’s not having actively engaged Beijing in the post-Pokhran scenario while the latter was obviously the most affected party of all the happenings. But more than, it was perhaps the fact that India’s display of its nuclear potential also outsmarted most of the Chinese estimates about India’s nuclear wherewithal. Whatever it is, the Indian side has since resumed its attempts towards breaking the ice with the Chinese leaders, and Indian Prime Minister’s special emissary Shri Jaswant Singh, has already opened high-level negotiations with the Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan during their prescheduled meeting when the two were in Manila to attend the ASEAN Regional Forum’s meeting in July. Speculations have been ripe ever since on Jaswant Singh’s impending visit to Beijing. In the final analysis, therefore, Pokhran-II may have temporarily disturbed the process of Sine-Indian CSBMs, but it is just an aberration, and before long the dark clouds over the sky of India-China relations may disappear. Hope my optimism augurs well for the future of Sino-Indian ties.

Appendix: Four Chronological Tables

Table 1: Pathbreaklng Interatlons, 1976-1996

1976 Ambassador K.R. Naraynan presented credentials in Beijing on July 24 and - Chen Zhaoyuan presented credentials in New Delhi on September 20.
1979 February: Atal Behari Bajpai became the first Indian Foreign Minister to visit China. 
1980 May: Mrs. Indira Gandhi and Hua Guofeng met during the funeral of President Joseph Tito in Belgrade. This was the first meeting of two prime ministers since 1959.
1981 June: Huang Hua became first Chinese Foreign Minister to visit India.
1988 December: Rajiv Gandhi became first Indian Prime Minister to visit China since 1955.
1989 July: Joint Working Group on Boundary Question held its first meeting in Beijing.
1991 December: Li Peng became first Chinese Prime Minister since 1960 to visit India.
1992 May: Ft. Venkataraman became first Indian President to ever visit China
1993 January: First visit to China by a Parliamentary delegation, lad by Speaker Shivraj Patil.
1993 November: ‘Zheng He”, China’s first naval vessel (a training ship), paid port visit to Bombay Last time Indian cruiser INS Mysur had ‘visited Shanghai in 1958.
1993 December: Li Ruihuan, Chairman of the 9th National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Committee paid his first visit to India.
1994 January: Wen Jiabao, an alternate member of the Political Bureau and member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee paid his first visit to India.
1994 February: The Sine-Indian Expert Group (set up to assist the JWG) comprising high ranking diplomats, surveyors, and military personnel from both sides held its first meeting in New Delhi.
1994 June: China’s Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Minister, Wu YI, came on her first visit to India.1994 July: General B.C. Joshi became the first Indian Chief of Army Staff, to visit China.
1994 September: General Chi Haotian became China’s first Defence Minister to visit India.
1994 October: K.R. Naraynan, became India’s first Vice President to visit China.
1996 March: Admiral V.S. Shekhawat became India’s first Chief of Naval Staff to visit China.
1996 May: Justice A.M. Ahmadi became India’s first Chief Justice to visit China.
1996 November: Jiang Zemin became first Chinese President ever to visit India.

Table 2: Sine-Indian Border Talks, 1981-1967

First Round: Beijing December 1981

The two sides started talks with their historically held dramatically opposite positions.

Second Round: New Delhi

 May 1982

Normalisation of bilateral relations facilitating  cooperation in their bilateral trade. Despite Indian protests against the Siono-Pak protocol on the opening of the khunjareb pass and Chinese protests over the inclusion of Arunachal Pradesh dancers at the closing caremony of Asian Games in New Delhi, the tenor and schedule of this official dialogue were not affected.

Third Round: Beijing   January  1983

Failed to find consensus on either Indian instance for "sector-by-sector" or Chinese reiteration for a 'comprehensive settlement".  No breakthrough appeared possible as (i) India did not have the necessary political incentive for fighting its domestic pressures against making any package deal, and (ii) Chinese leaders seemed quite satisfied with status quo ante.

Fourth Round: New Delhi October 1983

Showed some progress as China agreed for a sector-by-sector approach while India agreed to carry forward these talks towards as comprehensive solution.  These talks were followed soon by two signing a trade agreement in August 1984 bestowing each other the Most Favoured Nation status.

Fifth Round: Beijing  September 1984

In this improved bilateral understanding the two sides explicitly agreed to the one basic point i.e. "to maintain tranquility on the borders" till a final settlement of September 1993.

Sixth Round: New Delhi November 1985

In changed scenario after Mrs. gandhi's assassination in India and reports about China's nuclear collaboration with Pakistan as also fears that in the wake of Sino-Soviet border settlement china will transfer its troops from their Soviet border to Tibet created misgivings and thus vitiated atmosphere for talks.

Seventh Round: Beijing July 1986

By now, on the eve of Sumdorong Chu crisis of 1986-87, each side was already exchanging accusations and counter accusations in the eastern sector thus hardening their further position.

Eighth Round: New Delhi November 1987

Followed by visit by India's Defence and Foreign Ministers in April and June respectively, the two sides agreed that to break this statement on their boundary questions there was urgent need to provide the political thrust which came in the form of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's 1988 visit to beijing



Table 3: Joint Working Group on Boundary Question, 1989-1996

First Round:       Beijing July  1989

Held in the backdrop of prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's historic visit and India's continued yp support China despite Western sanction following its Tianamen square crisis, the meting demonstrated their  sincerity towards evolving CSBMs.

Second Round: new Delhi August-September 1990

The two sides by ascertaining "the principles and parameters" that should "govern settlement of the border issue." It established the first critical "mechanism" that initiated the periodic meeting between Indian and Chinese military commanders to "maintain peace and tranquility" along the border.

Third Round: Beijing     may 1991

With minority government of prime Minister Chandra Shekhar having just faced disqualification of its Foreign Ministers, V.C. Shukla and the general election approaching (in June 1991) neither side was expecting any major decision.

Fourth Round: New Delhi February 1992

For the first time senior military officials were part of the JWG met twice in 1992 which strongly reinforced their mutual understanding of each other leading to some major decisions in their next border talks.

Fifth Round: Beijing October 1992

Trying to increase frequency of their meetings, the JWG met twice strongly reinforced their mutual understanding of each other leading to some major decisions in their next border talks

Sixth Round: Beijing      July 1994

Among other things the JWG recommended measures to avoid troop concentration on border and setting up more meeting points between their military personnel on the border.

Eighth Round: Beijing August 1995

The two sides agreed to dismantle four military posts in the Wangdong area which was the first concrete action in terms of their proposed military disengagement on the border.

Ninth Round: Beijing October 1996

Though clearly overcast with the forthcoming visit to India by the Chinese President, the JWG agreed to expand their CSBMs and recommended for two points for annual meeting between their military commander on the border.

(i) Lipulekh in the middle sector and (ii) Dichu in the eastern sectore



Tenth Round: New Delhi August 1997

The two sides ratified their Agreement Extending CSBMs to the Military field (signed on November 29, 1996) and exchange instruments of ratification.

Table 4: Bold Initiatives, 1976-1996  


April 15: Foreign Minister, Y.B. Chavan became first one to announce in the Parliament that China and India had decided to restore their diplomatic relations at the Ambassadorial level.


February: During Foreign Minister Atal Behari Bajpai’s visit to Beijing, China (a) for the first time acknowledged that there was a border dispute; and, (b) assured to no longer support rebels in India’s northeast region.


June: Deng Xiaoping, (a) revived Zhou En-lai’s package proposal of 1960  China offered to recognise McMahon Line in the east for India’s abandonment of claims to the Aksai Chin in the western sector; and (b) softened their support to Pakistan on Kashmir describing it as a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan.



June: Foreign Minister Huang Hua during his visit to New Delhi announced that China would be opening two secred sites of Mansoravar and Kailash to Indian pilgrims. This visit also paved the way for beginning of first Sine-Indian broder talks which had eight rounds between 1981-1987.



April: China’s resumption of party-to-party ties between Communist Party of India (Marxist) which was later extended to the Congress Party and Bhartiya Janata Party as well.


February: The two sides signed a protocol granting each other most favoured nation status.


December: During Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visit to Beijing three agreements were signed on (a) cooperation in the field of science and technology; (b) granting reciprocal overflights rights and; and (c) two year cultural exchanges.



February: On February 2 the two signed agreement for resumption of border trade and on February 6 signed agreement opening Garbyang (Uttar Pradesh) as first border port. More points were later opened at Gunji (Uttar Pradesh) in 1992 and Shipki La (Himachal Pradesh) in 1994.


December: During Premier Li Peng visit to New Delhi the two sides signed five documents (i) on Mutual Establishment of Consulate Generals in Bombay and Shanghai, (ii) on Consullar Affairs, (iii) the Memorandum on Restoring Border Trade, (iv) the Protocol on Bilateral Trade for 1992, (v) the MoU on Scientitic &Technological Cooperation for Peaceful Use of Outer Space


September: During Prime Minister Narasimha Rae’s visit to Beijing, he and Premier Li Peng signed (i) the famous CBMs agreement, and (ii) agreement on cooperation in Radio 5 Television.


May: India Festival, the first such foreign show in China, had 130.strong group travelling to 16 cities in 5ldays. It was in response to the Chinese cultural festival in India during 1992.



August: The Joint Working Group (JWG) in its 8th meeting in New Delhi agreed to disengage troops from two posts from each side in the Wangdong tract which is first Asian example of disarmament.


October: The JWG agreed to open two more points (Dichy and Lepulekh) for annual meetings between the military commanders from the two sides.


November: During President Jiang Zemin’s visit to New Delhi the two signed four agreements: (i) on extending the CBMs to the military field, (ii) on combating smuggling of narcotics and arms, (iii) on maintenance of Indian Consulate in Hong Kong after July 1997, and (iv) on maritime shipping.



[1] Qian, Finance Minister sign agreement”. Xinhua (in English) plinked in FBIS-CHI-94-137, 16 July 1994, p. 9.

[2] Banking, Visa Agreements signed”, All India Radio (New Delhi), printed in FBIS-CHC94-205. 24 October 1994, p. 22.

[3] It is interesting to note that over 70 to 75 per cent of foreign investment in China come from the overseas Chinese who have been generally successful in business in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and much of the Southeast Asia and North America. For reasons of their emotional attachment with the mainland and for being so familiar with the ways and systems of this expanding Chinese market most overseas Chinese prefer to invest in China.

[4] Beijing estimates Joint Venture in India”, Xinhua (in English), printed in FBIS-CHI-93-013, 22 January 1993, p, 15.

[5] Jasjit Singh, “Future of Sine-Indian Relations”, Strategic Analysis, Volxvi No.11 (February 1994) p. 1512.

[6] Vivek Raghuvanshi, ‘China asks to Develop LCA fighter with India”, Defence News, 15-21 August, 1994.

[7] India, China and South Korea will form consortium: Plan to build passenger planes”, The Times of India (New Delhi), 26 August 1995.

[8] n. 31.

[9] Zheng Ruixiang and Dong Manyuan, ‘Developing friendly Sino-Indian relations on the rive Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”, Foreign Affairs (Beijing), No.12 [June 1969) pp. 69-70. Zheng Ruixiang and Dong Manyuan, ‘Developing friendly Sino-Indian relations on the rive Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”, Foreign Affairs (Beijing), No.12 [June 1969) pp. 69-70.

[10] D. Banerjee, “India-China relations and Chinese military capability’, Trishul. VoLlll No.1 (July 1990), p. 66.

[11] V.P. Dutt, ‘India and China: A leap into the future”, World Focus (New Delhi), Nos. 167.166 (November-December 1993) p. 51.

[12] No. 9, p. 291.

[13] Pravin Sawhney, “Massive Troop Pullout from China Border’, The Indian Express (New Delhi), 24 December 1992; also Pravin Sawhney, “Chinese Checker: Beijing calls the shots on the border dispute”, The Asian Age [New Delhi), 31 August, 1995.

[14] D. Banerjee, "India-China Relations and Chinese Military Capabilities", Trishul, Vol. iii No. 1 (July 1990), p.69.

[15] A.P. Venketeswaran, “Indian-China Relations: An overview”, World Focus (New Delhi), Nos. 1793160 (November-December 1994) p. 51.

[16] n.21.

[17] Batuk Vera, India-China Relations: Importance of the Tibet Card”, The Times of India (New Delhi), 5 April, 1996

[18] K. Subrahmanyam, “Sine-Pak Nuclear Deal: New Light on an Old Alliance”, The Times of India (New Delhi), 30 August, 1995; also K. Subrahmanyam, “Jiang Zemin Comes Calling: Talking Turkey to the Dragon”, The Times of India (New Delhi), 21 November 1996.

[19] Kathy Gannon, “Sine-Pakistan nuclear ties to continue: Jiang”, The Times of India (New Delhi), 2 December, 1996; also Kathy Gannon, “China to build new N-Plant in Pakistan”, The Times of India (New Delhi), 6 December, 1996.

[20] Zheng Ruixiang. “Sine-Indian Relations Under a New Situation”, Guoji Wenti Yanjiu (Beijing) No. 4 (October 1993), pp. 4-7. (Translated version in FEIS-CHI-93-219, 16 November 1993, p. 12: also Wen Boyen, “China, India and the New International Order”, China Report. Vol. 29 No. 3 (July-September 1993), p. 294.

[21] FBIS-CHI-95.204, 23 October 1995, p, 17.

[22] Raphael Pura, “ASEAN’s courtship of Burma makes key allies nervous”, Asian Wall Street Journal. 19-20 July, 1393; and Barry Wain, “The ASEAN Regional Forum is moving forward”, Asian Wall Street Journal, 19-20, July, 1996.

[23] For details see Jasjit Singh & Swaran Singh. Trends in Military Expenditures”, in Jasjit Singh (ed.), Asian Strategic Review 1997-98, (New Delhi: institute for Defence Studies & Analyses, September 1997), pp. 42-48.

Top of the Page

[ Previous Page | Contents of the Book | Next Page ]

HomeSearchContact usIndex

[ Home | Search  |  Contact UsIndex ]

[ List of Books | Kalatattvakosa | Kalamulasastra | Kalasamalocana ]

© 1998 Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts, New Delhi

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any manner without written permission of the publisher. 

Published in 1998 by 

Gyan Publishing House

5, Ansari Road, Darya Ganj,

New Delhi - 110 002.