The
21st century has been advertised as the Asian century. Asia has made
enormous progress in the last fifty years in every dimension - economic,
social and political. Yet the promise can only be fulfilled if Asian
governments demonstrate sufficient will and capacity. On the one hand, in
the new world of globalisation and interdependence this would require
independence of judgement and resilience to maintain it under pressure. On
the other hand, it also means abandoning the luxury of unabashedly pursuing
national interest. Competition must continue but within certain limitations
of transparency and teamwork imposed by common Asian objectives. Ultimately
Asia and the rest of the world would benefit as this is not a zerosum game.
The
key players would have to include Japan, the world’s No. 2 economy and
China a potential great power. It should also include India once she is able
to complete internal reforms and achieve her potential to be another great
power. Without a degree of harmonisation of attitudes between these key
players and the regional groupings the Asian dream is not attainable. India
and China have improved relations in the last two decades but much more can
be done.
After
1949 India-China relations after experiencing a high went down to a nadir in
1962 and remained frozen thereafter. The facts are well known. In-depth
analysis may still have to wait till the motivations of the Chinese
leadership are uncovered by historians. A new phase of gradual improvement
started with the exchange of Ambassadors in 1976, and the first high level
Chinese visit in 1976. This trend was concretised by Foreign Minister
Vajpayee’s visit in February 1979 and has continued till today despite
some temporary setbacks. It is no coincidence that Deng Xiaoping had then
just emerged as the unchallenged leader in China. The measure of improvement
can be appreciated if one takes the negative areas in the relationship that
have been eliminated or reduced to manageable proportions. Even by the time
Foreign Minister Huang Hua paid a return visit in 1981 official level
discussions had put many issues in perspective notwithstanding public
disagreement over Afghanistan and Cambodia. These have crystallised into
firm agreement in succeeding years. The challenge for the future is moving
the dialogue into positive areas.
The
humiliation suffered in the 1962 conflict and occupation of Indian territory
earlier resulted in an understandable emotional Indian reaction. For a long
time any attempt to find a compromise solution for the boundary dispute was
regarded as surrender and anti-national. Yet even Indian scholars are now
beginning to accept that neither the Indian nor Chinese boundary lines were
as sanctified by history and tradition etc. as the two sides so confidently
stated. Hence a negotiated settlement remains the only way out. But this was
unacceptable to both leaderships in the 1960s and later. Prime Minister Zhou
Enlai during his visit
in
1960 suggested some adjustments which the Indian side rejected. No progress
could be made at official level talks in 1961. Then came the border war and
relatively frozen relations, although courtesy was gradually restored. Deng
Xiaoping in his meeting with Vajpayee hinted at a compromise based on
existing ground realities which again could not be accepted by India. The
proposal was placed on record a little later by Deng in an interview with an
Indian journalist. The public Chinese position was that problems left over
by history could be kept aside while the climate was improved. During Huang
Hua’s visit, the gap between the two positions was partly bridged by the
Chinese accepting the need to give public priority to resolving the boundary
question and India accepting the need to simultaneously improve other
relations.
Since
then the boundary has been discussed at the official level in a series of
meetings and very gentle progress has been recorded. It is however important
to note that both governments have implemented their stated intentions to
maintain peace and tranquillity along the line of actual control. Minor
transgressions by either side a few limes in the last 35 years have never
been allowed to escalate out of control even after the Sumdurongcho
incident. During the conflicts with Pakistan in 1965 and 1971, despite
diplomatic rhetoric China did not seek to influence Indian strategy by
moving forces. The withdrawals of Indian forces from the border for use in
difficult times in Punjab, Kashmir and Sri Lanka have not been taken
advantage of. India too has never really taken advantage at times of Chinese
weakness in Tibet. In 1993 and 1996 formal agreements were signed which
provided for consultations, and to reduce military forces along the line of
control and above all, renouncing the use of force.
Emotion
in India would now accept a compromise once it demonstrated that honour is
uneffected in the Western Sector. Chinese security concerns about Tibet have
also been largely satisfied. The time now appears ripe to move towards
working out a final agreement on the boundary taking into account the
present ground position including the accession of Sikkim to India and the
real security requirements of the two parties.
Another
major area of concern on both sides was interference in domestic affairs and
support to anti-national groups. In the early years, the export of
revolution was seen as the bounden duty of all Communist States. Even with
the loud cheers of “Hindi Cheeni Bhai Bhai” in the air, material and
moral support was being given to dissident groups in India. This caused
India grave problems in dealing with the tribal groups in the North East.
India too was an active or passive participant in Western efforts to
destabilise China through Tibet. By 1980 both governments had realised that
the national interest did not benefit from these manoeuvres. In official
level discussions held during that year it was confirmed that official
support to each other’s insurgency was at an end. This position has
remained unchanged till now. By the mid-1990s both governments have
separately discovered the need to publicly castigate cross-border activities
by fundamentalists, militants etc. Common action is now necessary in this
area and also to control the menace posed by drug-trafficking and arms
smuggling. An agreement on drug traffic was signed during Jiang Zemin’s
visit to India in’ 1996.
Tibet
remains a very sensitive issue for China. India accepted Chinese
sovereignity in the 1954 Treaty. China’s more forceful exercise of control
and the consequent departure of the Dalai Lama for exile in India in 1959
put India in a delicate position just as the boundary dispute was escalating
from clashes towards conflict. The post-1962 clandestine operations and
their end are mentioned above. Following Vajpayee’s visit India’s
pilgrims were allowed access once more to Kailash and Mansarovar. China also
began to search fitfully for a modus vivendi with the Dalai Lama. This
effort has so far proved unsuccessful. Suspicions about India’s intentions
on Tibet are still voiced from time to time and protests lodged about the
sincerity with which the Dalai Lama is made to refrain from political
activity. Yet it would seem that China does not feel it is seriously
threatened in Tibet by India. Extending the doctrine of “one country two
systems” used for Hong Kong and Taiwan to Tibet might work better than the
present policy of forcing Tibet into the existing Chinese political system.
The Dalai Lama and most Tibetans would be quite satisfied with such a
half-way house. China’s present attitude causes a dilemma for India
between two cherished principles of maintaining pluralism while resisting
self determination. The earlier this difficulty is removed the better.
Third
country relationship have bedevilled India-China relations. South Asia has
provided the longest lasting friction. For Pakistan and China to make common
cause over the former’s problems with India was normal real political, but
to India which has espoused China’s case in world form against strong
western pressure this seemed gross ingratitude. Sir-to-Pak
military-collaboration was seen as the major security threat and also became
one of India’s most serious diplomatic preoccupations, Pakistan did
benefit enormously from the supports of weapons and the transfer of
technology especially nuclear technology. Support to
Pakistan
over Kashmir, to Bangladesh, to the Nepalese call for a zone of peace and
independence and over almost every other contentious issue to subcontinental
neighbours against India further embittered relations. China’s diplomatic
support emboldened India’s neighbours to take a tough line vis-a-vis
India. It must be accepted that India too was unreasonable in certain
matters and made it easy for China to join in the chorus against India’s
“hegemony”.
By
the 1960s the refrain began to change. In line with Deng’s thesis that
developing countries needed peace to concentrate on development, the tenor
of Chinese statement was to urge South Asian countries to resolve their
problems among themselves while reassuring them that the bilateral
relationship with China would not be affected by the improvement of
Sino-Indian relations. This attitude was taken a little further during the
recent visit of President Jiang Zemin to South Asia in 1996 during which
developing a relationship with South Asia as a single entity was given pride
of place. By this time China had also acquiesced to U.S. pressure by
stopping the transfer of nuclear technology to Pakistan. lndia must find
ways quickly to give greater substance to a China-South Asian relationship.
There are still important elite groups in China and India who have to
realise the inevitability of regional cooperation in the context of
globalisation. India and the smaller South Asian states have already
understood the value of regional cooperation. The China card is no longer in
play. To make China and other neighbouring regional groups economic partners
of SAARC is the next logical step. Energy, environment, water resources,
transport and infrastructure are among the areas that can provide for
fruitful cooperation. It would also reinforce the inevitability of South
Asian regional cooperation to Pakistan.
India’s
earlier interaction with China was mainly in the Asian arena. India helped
bring about and implement the Korean Armistice and Indo-Chinese Peace
Accords, China entered the world stage at the Afro-Asian conference at
Bandung in 1954 on a fraternal note. But Asian developments soon established
the divergence of policies. China supported revolution in Malaysia,
Sukarno’s fight against neo-imperialism and hoped to shape the ideology
and attitudes of newly emergent Afro-Asian countries according to Mao’s
ideas. By 1965, this effort had largely failed as the army displaced Sukarno
and South East Asia began to stabilise; the 1965 Afro-Asian Conference never
materialised; and the Cultural Revolution isolated China. Meanwhile the
Non-Aligned Movement with India as a leader was becoming the standard bearer
of the Third World.
Today’s
situation is very different awhich portends against taking anything for
granted. China has reversed herself on almost all policies, and is accepted
as a important power and major partner in the Asia-Pacific Region. India has
become an outsider mainly because its economy has stagnated and its
indifference in taking more than minimal interest in Asia. India will have
to work hard and emerge as a credible partner for South East and East Asia
if it is to become a player in the Asian system.
The
evolution of the cold war had its fallout on India-China relations. In its
early days when everything was black and white India’s efforts to play
peacemaker and to push China’s claims in the UN. etc. got her dubbed as a
fellow-traveller in McCarthy’s America. The inevitable improvement of
relations with the Soviet Union after Pakistan joined American-sponsored
alliances raised doubts in China at a time when the Soviet Union’s
revolutionary credentials were being questioned by Mao. The Soviet Union
after some hesitations leaned towards India after 1962. Ironically China’s
objections to detente were speedily set aside when the opportunity came in
1971 to establish relations with the USA. Pakistan was the conduit. When
India was about to face a major confrontation with Pakistan over Bangladesh
coupling with Pakistan’s getting closer to China and the U.S.A. it was
necessary to formalise India’s linkage with the Soviet Union in the
Indo-Soviet Treaty.
Bangladesh
was liberated and recognised. India’s threat perceptions diminished and
the lndo-Soviet Treaty’s utility also diminished. There was a brief flurry
of concern when the Soviet action in Afghanistan seemed to revive earlier
concerns. But they faded away soon enough. Despite the efforts of a section
of the Indian leadership it became clear that Soviet and Indian interests
over China did not necessarily coincide.
Indo-china
and Vietnam also posed a source of friction. China did not support North
Vietnam as whole heartedly as they did North Korea. China and Vietnam are
historical rivals. Further, the Chinese establishment -- and Deng in
particular-developed a strong antipathy to the Vietnamese leadership. The
leading Soviet role in supporting Hanoi could have played its part. For
India on the other hand, supporting Vietnam was a cardinal principle of her
non-aligned policy. China’s police action against Vietnam in 1979 during
Vajpayee’s visit, and India’s recognition of the Vietnamese-installed
Heng Samrin Government in Cambodia caused temporary polemics. However they
did not really impede the process of normalisation between India and China
after 1979. One obvious conclusion is that China is callous and India
over-sensitive to third country interests.
Most
contentious issues have been eliminated by chance or effort from the
India-China agenda by now. The major remaining question, i.e. the boundary,
can new be settled if the two governments so desire and show the will. Tibet
is not really an issue for India and she would be relieved if China and the
Tibetans are able to find an accommodation. On South Asia the common ground
is growing. There still remains the removal of overall suspicions caused by
the hangover of threat perceptions and security concerns over the last 35
years. A limited dialogue between senior military officials has begun and
there has been exchanges between think-tanks. However, there is no sign of
any attempt to begin a substantive dialogue on military postures and threat
perceptions including nuclear threats. Both sides appear to be unwilling to
take this up for reasons which are unclear but can be surmised, i.e.
existing vested interests. However, they should seriously consider that
their basic premise of ensuring peace for development requires transparency
and confidence building on security. The more so as it is clear from the
1996 Border Agreement that there is nothing to gain from conflict. This
would require that the shadow-boxing whether India is or is not a nuclear
power should cease. There could be the further bonus that this would give a
fillip to confidence building between India and Pakistan.
There
has been a procession of significant high level visits which have helped to
improve relation culminating in the visit of Jiang Zemin in 1996. It is
important to note that they have covered the broad spectrum of the
leadership in the two countries. There is an effective dialogue on economic,
cultural and intellectual exchanges. However the level of such exchanges is
not commensurate with the existing potential. Trade had quadrupled in this
decade and can certainly be expanded many times further if the will is there
and the effort is made to study and penetrate markets. Opening up border
trade has promise and could ease
conditions
inside Tibet.
Greater
understanding of the other country has to be pursued. China does undertake
fairly systematic studies into the Indian polity, economy and society in
specialised institutions. Indian scholarship on China which had been
commendable has suffered in recent years from a lack of resources and
support. It needs to be strengthened. There must also be much larger process
of exchanges than at present between experts in social sciences, physical
sciences, technology etc.
Both
countries are grappling with an immense task of developing an economy and a
society with a very large population which makes them unique. Chinese
economic reform would have many lessons for India as it started at least 10
years earlier. The evolution of the Indian political system may similarly
provide some guidelines as the Chinese seek to modernise their society.
Perhaps in the past both have been affected by the “middle kingdom”
complex of believing that they know best. Mao’s China and Nehru’s India
were probably the last manifestation of this superiority complex. But today
we know only too well that everyone commits mistakes which can be very
costly in terms of progress. A greater willingness to undertake comparative
studies could be of mutual benefit. The external environment is of
increasing relevance in the era of globalisation. As developing countries
dealing with the industrialised world the two countries share a common
agenda. The U.S. and its allies will try to retain the existing unipolar
system. India and China need an international system with multipolarity,
i.e. more democratic decision-making. Should they not share views and concert
action to greater effect? No one wants to confront the U.S. rather to
convert it from unilateralism to partnership.
In
the current post-cold war world, China, Russia and India do have parallel
interests in stability in Central Asia. The sooner they start taking
concrete action the better, Chinese actions in Myanmar have roused some
suspicions about her intended role in the Indian Ocean. However, at present
her attitude is unlikely to diverge materially from that of India and the
rest of the Indian Ocean Region in wishing to preserve stability there. A
direct dialogue is obviously called for to ensure this.
The
need is for a positive attitude towards a positive dialogue. It should be
substantive and would in time expand itself. No time should be lost in
getting it off the ground. What a better India-China understanding requires
is positive agenda for positive action.
